Jane Austen's novel Sense and Sensibility opens with Mrs Dashwood's rich stepson and his wife considering what provision they should make for her and her three daughters, since the unexpected death of Mr Dashwood has left them with very little capital. The estate entails upon the brother and he has promised his late father to make sure they are comfortable. His initial impulse to give £3,000 to the three daughters is gradually whittled down by his wife to helping them move house, giving them some furniture, and sending occasional presents of money, fish and game.' The history of government funding of Maori initiatives has exhibited rather the same pattern with an initial generosity giving way to niggardliness.
In this paper I intend to draw together two themes -the promises that were made to Maori tribes in the period from 1986 to 1989 and how these have been implemented in the following years, and to make some recommendations on how Treaty claims might be funded.
FUNDING THE DEPARTMENT OF MAORI AFFAIRS
Up until 1929 the Department essentially existed to service the Native Land Purchase Board, the Native Land Court and the Maori Land Boards, and to administer the £7,000 for native purposes in the Civil List 2 Its role dramatically changed in 1928 when Ngata became Native Minister and inaugurated Maori land development. Although the Development Schemes absorbed the bulk of funding and the new staff appointments, Ngata wanted a wider role for the Department in encouraging Maori economic and social developments and his actual schemes aimed for what could be called community development.
3 As a result of his initiatives the funding of the Department jumped from a lowly 0.2% of government expenditure in 1929 to 1.29% 1950s and the Education Department gnawed on the issue like a dog on a bone, the most obvious result was a series of reports, while the situation failed to improve. The most notable initiatives-the Maori Education Foundation and Kohanga Reo -owed more to Maori Affairs Department than the Education Department.
By starving the Department of Maori Affairs of funding the government was also putting a cap on new initiatives to try to solve the emerging problems and dissatisfactions of the period after 1968.
The great advantage the old Department of Maori Affairs brought to any problem was that it could analyse it in a holistic way and come up with lateral solutions. Other government agencies were constrained by their narrower brief and could only deal with problems that were directly related to the programme. Labour Department, faced with rapidly growing Maori unemployment, could not propose policies to directly influence the educational under achievement and family problems that were a significant factor in Maori unemployment.
Again I should note that since the new educational reforms, the Ministry of Education has taken a very active approach to fostering Maori language teaching and improving Maori educational performance. The new philosophy of educational management also gives Maori parents much more direct control than in the past. Yet there remains the problem that unlike the old Department which was able to take a holistic view of Maori problems, current government departments have strictly limited spheres of operation and cannot make a comparable impact.
There is another important point to notice, too. Though the Department had promoted urbanisation it had not come up with new policies and programmes to help the economic and cultural development of new urban Maori. Even as late as the 1988 financial year, expenditure was hopelessly weighted in favour of the old centres of population. The two Auckland urban districts of Auckland and Wiri received $14.9m less in their budgets than their population and rate of unemployment would have justified. Whangarei on the other hand received $7.5 m more than was justified and Gisborne and Rotorua $5.4m; a large proportion of money was also disbursed through Head Office.
7 Although the department considered supplying significant programmes to rural districts and to Maori from those districts migrating to the cities, it did not take the next step of developing programmes to meet the needs of the urban generation. It would be fair to say that Kohanga Reo was the only programme that really benefited urban areas as much as rural. The failure to allocate additional resources led, in my view, to a fossilisation of spending programmes with no incentive to devise new programmes to meet urban needs.
While Maori frustration vented itself on other issues, a hidden factor of this discontent must be considered to be the lack of properly funded programmes that attempted to meet Maori aspirations. When I first considered this paper I believed that the average expenditure over the whole period would be close to 1% a year. That it was as low as 0.7% and had been decreasing since the 1931-1940 decade came as a major surprise to me. However, I think it also explains rather well the stagnation and frustrations of the 1970s and 1980s in Maori communities.
Looking at population growth and needs, it still seems to me that the required figure for a realistic funding was about 1%. Certainly it was in that magnitude during the periods when Maori Affairs was considered to be achieving results, 1931 to 1949 and again in the early 1960s (range was 0.73 to 0.89), and I consider it is the baseline figure that is necessary to achieve noticeable improvements. (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) responded to this well-nigh universal request from the Maori community to honour the Treaty, by better funding the Waitangi Tribunal and by extending its jurisdiction to hear claims from 1840, declaring that they wished to resolve Maori grievances and honour the Treaty.
I remember the high hopes that were held that the Waitangi Tribunal and the Treaty process would be a way of re-endowing Maori tribes. However, even at that time I had to point out in discussions that an undeveloped historiography and the natural cumbersomeness of any legal process would not make it a fast or easy process. I also wondered if it would benefit those tribes whose problems stemmed from their geography and the nature of social and economic development, rather than from overt government wrongdoing.
As an aside it should also be noted that it took the Labour government a long time to really understand the implications of the process they had begun. The Treaty of Waitangi Policy Unit was not established until early 1989, their fifth year in office, with the brief of coordinating the Government's policy on the Treaty. Later in 1989 it was given the task of conducting direct negotiations with claimants to honour the promise Richard Prebble had made to Tainui that they could have direct negotiations. At that point no provision had been made for claims settlements. Labour had not grasped the magnitude of the claims; it was thought that Cabinet would approve any settlements that were made and pay them through the Justice Department vote.
• It seems the assumption was that settlements would be of the magnitude of the Orakei settlement; it was not appreciated that the large claims of Ngaitahu, Tainui and Taranaki would be in the hundreds of millions of dollars.
NEGATIVE SPENDING AND WELFARE DEPENDENCY
There was another strand of Maori opinion that wrestled with the apparent stagnation in economic and social advancement of the 1970s. Strangely enough, systematic government underfunding was not identified as a problem, though the need for funding to be better deployed was part of the debate. Indeed the only area where there was a strong feeling, was in a belief that Maori were systematically deprived of capital, so they could not build up worthwhile assets and become significant players in the private sector. There was agitation for a Maori bank that could make large sums of money available to incorporations and Maori businesses. The MANA programme and the Maori Development Corporation were the fruits of this concern.
Instead, the debate tended to become focused on the mechanisms for delivering programmes and the need for better policies and programmes, and whether the present inadequate ones had locked Maori into a cycle of dependency and poverty. Implicit in this was a criticism of the role and nature of the Department of Maori Affairs. The lack of Maori control over the delivery of services was also commented on.
The unanimously endorsed Kawenata (Covenant) of the Maori Economic Summit Conference (Hui Taumata) held in December 1984 captured very well the thinking of the period of the early 1980s. Three key problems were identified: 1. Welfare dependency. Government policies were held to increasingly perpetuate this because these locked Maori into a welfare system that discouraged individual initiative and caused loss of group identity. 2. Too many Maori failed to benefit from the educa-. tion system and the occupational opportunities it opened up. 3. Government financial resources were locked up in negative spending patterns that did not assist economic progress and therefore the attainment of economic and social equality. It was estimated that some $360 million was tied up in this negative spending. As solutions the Kawenata proposed:
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A conscious attempt to restore self-determination
by progressively moving the resources devoted to negative outcomes into the tribal system. 2. The strengthening of the Maori tribal system to provide an environment for new social and economic initiatives. 3. A development decade to 'significantly reduce the imbalance between Maori and non-Maori in economic, social and cultural terms'. Though ritual obeisance was made to the ' development decade' from time to time by the Department and the Minister of Maori Affairs, the 'decade' smacked too much of indicative planning to fit in with the new mood of Rogernomics and so was never important in the development of policy.
IWI DEVELOPMENT Dr Reedy, Secretary of Maori Affairs, was an enthusiast for the tribal approach; the 1986 Annual Report of the Department advocated recognition of iwi and strengthening of the structures of whanau and hapii. The Department initiated the two new programmes, MANA and MACCESS, on a tribal basis.
The fourth Labour Government of 1984-1990 helped this approach by its desire to restructure the public service. Part of its policy was to separate commercial, operational, policy and regulatory functions. The government was also concerned that the centralised, interventionist, welfare state model New Zealanders had become accustomed to was costly and imiffective. The Department, with its mixture of regulatory (Maori Land Court), commercial, operational (Maori Trustee, Maori Land Dev elopment, Housing) and policy functions, and a culture marked by a paternal, bureaucratic attitude, clearly did not fit. In addition, its reputation had been blighted by the 'Hawaiian Loans Affair' and the Labour Cabinet had some desire to get rid of it.
The new emphasis on efficiency, accountability and ( most attractive of all from a Maori viewpoint) devolution, offered new opportunities for iwi development because it meant shifting responsibility for the delivery of services from centralised structures.
On 24 June 1987 Cabinet agreed that to achieve a true partnership between the Government and the Maori people, there had to be a devolution of responsibility to the Maori people themselves for the management of government programmes. Government proposals took the form of a discussion document He Tirohanga Rangapil (Partnership Perspectives) . This emphasised partnership with iwi organisations in the development and operation of policies. It proposed establishing a new Ministry responsible for Maori policy to act as a control department on all Maori issues, in a role similar to Treasury and the State Services Commission. The Department of Maori Affairs was to be phased out and its operational programmes transferred to mainstream departments; these in turn were to improve their responsiveness on Maori issues.
There was extensive consultation in a series of 55 hui. These showed Maori were deeply opposed to the abolition of the Department of Maori Affairs and concerned with the mainstreaming of programmes because they felt mainstream departments would continue to be unresponsive to Maori needs.
In November 1988 the government issued a policy statement called He Urupare Rangapil (Partnership Response) . The Ministry of Maori Affairs would remain, but the operational sections of Maori Affairs would be restructured into the Iwi Transition Agency. The new Agency would exist for five years to help iwi develop their operational base so that they would be better placed to receive programmes from the mainstream departments. The Maori Land Court would be transferred to the Justice Department. A Runanga Iwi Act was passed to help create legal entities from traditional tribal structures and to allow the Maori Land Court to resolve disagreements." Two contemporary references from semi-official sources sum up the easy optimism of this period: 1. The Board of Maori Affairs was disbanded. Programmes that were previously under board control such as Mana Business Enterprises and Maori Access Schemes are maintained by Te Tira Ahu Iwi, until iwi assume control. In the policy battles that took place over the report, the opportunity was taken to abolish both the Ministry and the Iwi Transition Agency and to replace them with a new Ministry of Maori Development. This was inaugurated on 1 January 1992.
Since then there has been a policy of constantly reducing the Ministry's budget by removing programmes, from the high point of the 1989-90 financial year (when $254.5m was budgeted) to the 1995-96 financial year (when its budget has been reduced to $48.34m).
At the flax roots I understand that the promised transfer of assets to the iwi has not taken place. The Taranaki Trust Board received an initial establishment grant of $100,000 from the Iwi Transition Agency and since then it has lost MANA and MACCESS funding as both programmes have been disestablished. 14 The claims process has however proved more robust, and the government has continued its commitment to settling Maori grievances. It has, of course, become clear that the settlements will be large. The problem of funding this has become an urgency for Cabinet and the fiscal envelope has been the result.
There seems to be a symmetry in the timings, that as the Ministry and Iwi funding is being shrunk, the Government is finding another large sum of money to meet Treaty claims through the fiscal envelope. Though, alas, there is not an exact equivalence (since the $200m saved from departmental funding has not been wholly redirected to. meet Treaty claims) the Government, as I understand the mechanism, is committing itself to spending $lOOm a year. Fiscal constraint has also been met-the Government has saved $lOOm.
It is hard not to feel that the essential Maori experience of government never changes -Machiavellian and intrinsically niggardly.
